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The MIT Japan Program was founded in 1981 to create a new generation
of technologically sophisticated "Japan-aware" scientists, engineers, and
managers in the United States. The Program's corporate sponsors, as
well as support from the government and from private foundations, have
made it the largest, most comprehensive, and most widely emulated
center of applied Japanese studies in the world.
The intellectual focus of the Program is to integrate the research
methodologies of the social sciences, the humanities, and technology to
approach issues confronting the United States and Japan in their
relations involving science and technology. The Program is uniquely
positioned to make use of MIT's extensive network of Japan-related
resources, which include faculty, researchers, and library collections, as
well as a Tokyo-based office. Through its three core activities, namely,
education, research, and public awareness, the Program disseminates
both to its sponsors and to the interested public its expertise on Japanese
science and technology and on how that science and technology is
managed.
The MIT Japan Program Working Paper Series provides an important
means to achieving these ends.
1The issue of intercultural transferability of a management system is
both old and new. Recent debates on the transferability of the Japanese
management system to a foreign environment have rekindled this
traditional problem.
During a speculative period, when the influence, if any, of
Japanese management practice was limited mainly to cheap manufactured
exports, culturalist explanations prospered (Benedict, 1946; Nakane,
1970). The implication was that Japanese organization was so much
ingrained in its own distinctive culture and employment relationships
derived thereof, let alone the support from "docile" and "feudal"
Japanese workers, it should by no means be transferable if any of its
advantages were to be maintained. Echoing this was the contentions of
organizational theory and industrial sociology which suggested the
inseparability or "embeddedness" of organizations within their societal
environments. It was presumed that the transference of organizations to
a foreign environment would affect their performance as they gradually
assumed attributes of the new environment. More specifically, it was
argued that the primary advantage of Toyotaism over Fordism was a
stronger labor process control of the workforce in Japan which could not
be replicated in the West where more "advanced" forms of industrial
relations existed (Dohse, Juergens and Malsch, 1985).
However, a wave of Japanese "transplants" in various parts of the
world has produced overwhelming counterevidence that the Japanese
management system, especially its production organization, is
interculturally transferable with few practical constraints (Takamiya,
1979; White and Trevor, 1983; Krafcik, 1986; Dunning, 1986; Walker,
1988; Abo et al., 1990; Florida and Kenney, 1991).
The issue now appears -- not whether or not it is transferable but
-- whether the diffusion of a new system, or according to some authors
"lean production" (Womack, Jones and Roos, 1990), can be successfully
made without direct involvement of Japanese management. Existing
evidence of successful transfers invariably appears to be associated
with direct involvement of the Japanese -- be they "transplants" or
contract technical teaching. An examination of the question is critical
for mapping out future trajectories of the competing paradigms of
productive organization in industrial societies. Moreover, the issue
can be a crucial test for the contention that the Japanese model could
be a potentially generalizable successor to Fordist mass production
(Florida and Kenney, 1991) and in particular for the generalizability of
the Japanese paradigm with or without Japanese agents.
Dysfunctionality
Recent evidence demonstrates that it is not so difficult for Western
producers to import and implement institutional artifacts of the
Japanese system, prima facie at least. For example, automotive
producers in the U.S. and Europe have introduced a whole shopping list
of the "Japanese techniques": teams, quality circles, kaizen activities,
fewer job classifications, suggestion systems, buttons for workers to
stop the assembly line, multi-machine operations, U-shaped lines,
suppliers' early involvement in design, self-certified suppliers,
"black-box" design of components, simultaneous engineering, project
managers, cost targeting, profit sharing, joint product design, just-in-
time supply of manufacturing, etc.
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3It has proven to be difficult, however, to successfully implement
and maintain the new system. The author's field interviews in the U.S.
and Europe with assemblers and suppliers alike have consistently
suggested difficulties in gaining expected results. It has often been
implied that the new system's transfer without direct involvement of
Japanese producers could be categorically difficult. Would this lead to
a revival of the culturalist contentions after all?
In what follows, theoretically-informed propositions on the issues
of intercultural transfer of management practice and constraints thereof
will be presented. These draw mainly on the qualitative side of an
empirical study being conducted by the author with regard to supplier
relations, particularly collaborative components development, in the
world's automotive industry.
Reconstruct of Fairness
On the basis of both historical and comparative evidence, it has been
demonstrated that the current practice of Japanese supplier relations is
a long-standing evolutionary product of socioeconomic, technological,
political and producer-level strategic factors. There is no direct
evidence that the Japanese culture in itself can explain its emergence,
development and prosperity. Moreover, it has been argued that by
providing formerly laissez-faire trading patterns with structures and
governance mechanisms, through which high-quality, low cost products are
continuously produced, the new paradigm is found to have disentangled
economic rationality from cultural myths (Nishiguchi, 1992).
Through this study, as well as the author's ongoing field research,
there have emerged three key norms that may account at a more non-
4technical and generalized level for varying degrees of performance in
adaptation to the new paradigm: fairness, rationality and integration.
When trading behavior is assumed to be dictated by market forces in
the tradition of neoclassical economic theory, the application of the
concept of fairness, if any, is simple. Give fair opportunities to
competing agents in the market place, let them bid, and give contracts
to those who bid the cheapest.
The traditional bidding pattern of U.S. automotive producers was
just like that. Earlier in history, as parts were made fully
interchangeable, so were workers at Ford's Highland Park factory. In a
similar vein, the classical mass production system perfected the
interchangeable supplier (Nishiguchi, 1988).
While Detroit was perfecting the concept of fairness on the market,
Japanese automotive producers were working on their own version of a
"fair" trading system based on radically different principles. Along
with the development of contract assembly and systems components
outsourcing, which made it dysfunctional to rely on market prices, the
cost targeting method was developed. Increasingly, complex cost
structure was decomposed into parts and cost-sensitive elements were
identified item by item. For this purpose, assemblers and suppliers
shared cost data. Rather than negotiating price downstream, assemblers
and suppliers alike began step by step to look at the possibility of
reducing costs at the source by means of joint problem solving based on
the objective value analysis (VA) method. Moreover, suppliers became
involved in design to further reduce costs using joint value engineering
(VE) techniques. As a result, continuous cost reduction was
I
systematized during the course of a product cycle, and the fifty-fifty
"profit sharing" rules were established.
The cost targeting and profit sharing rules work as follows. The
cost targeting of product development is based on the market-price-
minus, rather than cost-plus, principles. The sale price of a new car
model is first determined: for example, X dollars, with Y profits and Z
costs. The cost of each part is then evaluated. Through this process,
the cost for a console box, for example, is determined as C dollars,
within which the required specifications for this part, such as
performance, quality, durability, feel and appearance, must be met. By
jointly evaluating various possibilities -- in view of functional
necessities for the consumer -- in design, materials, surface treatment,
mechanisms, manufacturing methods and the like, the aggregate of
individual part costs must be reduced step by step to the target while
keeping the required specifications constant. VE techniques are
particularly useful in this process. Suppliers' proposals are
encouraged because of their intimate professional knowledge of the part
concerned. After Job 1 (i.e., the roll-off of a new car model), design
modifications to further reduce costs are continuously pursued. VA
techniques are especially helpful at this stage.
Concomitant with the cost targeting of new product development was
the emergence of "profit-sharing rules" between purchaser and supplier
during the 1960s in Japan. If, for example, as shown in Figure 1, the
price for an instrument cluster in the dash board was agreed on as 120
points for the first car model year, during which time 110 points, a
target price for the second year, was in fact achieved by their "joint"
efforts, then, the assembler paid the supplier 115 points, thus sharing
-- ----
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the incremental profit evenly. If, however, further cost reduction was
achieved during that period, say, down to 108 points, then, the balance
went to the supplier. In other words, the assembler did not ask for a
cheaper price than the second-year target price. In the second year,
the assembler paid either 109 or 110 points net, and further cost
reduction was continuously pursued by encouraging additional supplier
proposals.
Figure 1 about here
This rule setting was a significant departure from the traditional
practice in which supplier incentives for improvement were frequently
negated by the purchaser's attempts to try to monopolize the benefits of
its suppliers' new ideas. In contrast, the new arrangements kindled
supplier entrepreneurship and lead to a virtuous circle of purchaser-
supplier competition and cooperation (Nishiguchi, 1992).
Referring to the profit sharing norm, a manager of a European
multinational brake supplier remarked: "The Japanese customers are tough
negotiators. But at the same time they are the most fair." Similarly,
a sales director of a Japanese multinational wire harness supplier
located in the U.S. commented: "We do business with almost all the major
assemblers in the world. On an operational level, our Japanese
customers are perhaps the most demanding. But unlike Western customers
who tend to sever business relationships lightheartedly, we can be one
hundred percent sure that as long as we show them the result of our
continuous improvement, the Japanese customers never say, 'Hey, we no
--"11---1---1-1_-____._I ___11. ...--II--
7longer need you next year. Good-bye.'" (The author's interviews in May
1991 and March 1988 respectively.)
Institutionalizing Rationality
In a way, it is striking how little the Japanese model has added to the
classical notion of "rationality" as defined by Max Weber: the use of
the most efficient means to achieve objectives. In Weberian terms,
rationality, as embodied in his classical notion of "bureaucracy," is
the strongest ground for authority in modern society. Bureaucracy, in
its original meaning at least, is proposed as the most rational form of
organization, characterized by such attributes as appointment by
qualification, clear definition of rules and responsibilities, and a
continuous striving for efficiency. In this type of organization,
descriptive rather than ascriptive attributes, defines the qualification
of the occupants of the office, and the exercise of authority is
strictly restricted to what is necessary for the successful achievements
of the objectives of the organization. This is similarly echoed in one
of the principles of the Toyota Production System: "Make only necessary
rules, teach then effectively, and carefully monitor how they are
followed."
Applied to the Japanese paradigm of employment and trading
relations, particularly pronounced when the system is "transplanted" in
a foreign industrial soil, the following can be readily observable: 1)
recruitment of well-qualified managers, workers and suppliers, 2)
carefully elaborated rules and procedures, 3) orderly systems of grading
and feedback, and 4) clear lines of command.
ls·`----11-----------·I----- 1-·
8The notion of just-in-time production itself (i.e., providing only
the necessary amount of the necessary items at the right time and place)
is a sheer manifestation of economic rationality. If a firm is more
rational in production organization than its competitors, then it will
naturally be the most efficient and the most profitable. Toyota is a
case in point.
The striking success of NUMMI, despite the counterproductive pre-
conditions that accompanied it. (Krafcik, 1986; Paul Adler, 1991;,
Nishiguchi, 1991), and the similar categorical successes of the Japanese
automotive transplants in the U.S. (Abo et al., 1990; Florida and
Kenney, 1991) clearly demonstrate that the advantages of the Japanese
paradigm are embedded not in any particular national culture but in its
institutional rationality. Therefore, the practice is not substantively
affected by transference to even a non-conducive environment.
Integration
While there may or may not be any distinctive elements in terms of
rationality in the Japanese system, a radically new value is arguably
created by Japanese producers in the process of a new model building:
integration or unification of apparently contradictory factors as
conventionally perceived.
Traditional Western thought has emphasized manifestly dichotomous
forces. For example:
- capital and labor (Marx, 1977; Braverman, 1974)
- large and small firms (Edwards, 1979; Piore and Sabel, 1984)
- productivity versus quality
___ .___ ___1___1_______________II___ 1_1
9- group orientation and individual creativity
- physical capabilities as opposed to intelligence of workers
- assemblers and suppliers
- carrots and sticks
- Theory X and Theory Y (McGregor, 1960)
- top-down and bottom-up decision making
- markets and hierarchies (Williamson, 1975)
In sharp contrast, the Japanese management system is characterized
by "unifying" and "integrating" forces to accommodate prima facie
unreconcilable and exclusionary entities. For example:
- harmonious labor-management relations
- efficiency as well as quality
- intelligent and physically capable workers
- creativity and conformity
- collaborative design and manufacturing between assembler and
supplier (Nishiguchi, 1992)
- synergistic co-existence of large and small firms (Ibid.)
- Theory Z as a sublime form of Theory X and Y (Ouchi, 1982)
- "integrating" project manager (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991)
- "middle-up-down" management and lines of organizational decision
making (Nonaka, 1988)
- "clustered control" (Nishiguchi, 1992) or "intermediate"
organization rather than spot contracting or vertical
integration (Imai, Itami and Koike, 1982)
-----·
10
Inasmuch the information process school of thought reduced the
human agent to an ant and transaction cost economics reduced the
economic man to a wicked, opportunistic agent, traditional Western
approach has thus trivialized the potential of human capabilities. They
have been confined to the domain of "time motion" studies (e.g., Taylor,
1947) or at best "commodified" (e.g., the "human resource" school).
In sharp contrast, the Japanese approach has enlarged the potential
for human labor and interorganizational collaboration by unifying or
integrating forces rather than dividing or atomizing them within the
boundaries of specialization. This clearly indicates that the Japanese
model entails the emergence of a new logic that sustains an orqanization
of a third kind, the essence of which cannot be adequately captured
within traditional frameworks - be they related to decision making
processes, human resource management, supplier relations or product
development organization.
It can be argued that to unlock the secret of the new paradigm
arisen from Japan may well serve at the same time to account for the
apparent failure of the traditional American paradigm. The paradigm
that emphasized mass production and vertical integration (Chandler,
1962; Williamson, 1975) could no longer be considered the organizational
model of dominance (Womack, Jones and Roos, 1990).
Legitimating Authority
However much emphasis is placed on harmony between management and labor
or on partnership and collaboration between assembler and supplier, it
is ultimately management and the assembler which exercise authority in
business relationships. Orders are always given from management to
I
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workers and from assemblers to suppliers, not in a reversed manner.
Final decisions are invariably made by management and the purchaser.
What concerns in practice, especially in a situation whereby
radically new systems are transplanted, is how this authority is
legitimated. Put bi-modally, on what basis is it justified by those who
exercise it, and on what basis is it accepted by those who obey it?
It is predictable that if there is a decay or shortage of
justification and acceptance of management authority, the institutional
imitation alone (be it a long-term contract or early supplier
involvement in product development) would be almost irrelevant to the
objectives of new institutional programs. Should there be no fair rules
or procedures equally shared between trading partners, or no rationality
in the behavior of those who command authority in the eyes of those who
receive it, the whole project could potentially collapse. The shortage
of rationality and hence fragility in authority would surely lead to
dysfunctionality. The predictable result would be that new practices
sooner or later would revert to the domain of old mechanisms which were
sustained by other means of support.
Management Effectiveness
Arguably, there has been a recognizable decay in management authority
and effectiveness over the recent Anglo-American business culture. For
example, White and Trevor (1983: 10) argue: "In Britain the insistence
by workers and unions on a measure of control over their work, and the
existence of high levels of industrial conflict, can be interpreted as a
weakening of belief in the legitimacy of management authority.
Management can no longer expect its decisions or actions to remain
 
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unquestioned." Similarly, Hayes (1981: 66) claims: "The lack of
managerial elitism in the United States used to be a source of wonder to
Europeans, whose managerial traditions reflected the deep divisions
between social classes. With some shock, we recognize the emergence of
elitism and lack of trust in the United States -- managers who isolate
themselves from workers, both physically and emotionally; who have no
direct experience in the businesses they manage; who see their role as
managing resource allocation and other organizational processes rather
than as leadership by example."
Innovative management in both intra- and inter-organizational
relations is likely to be accepted only if workers and suppliers
perceive it as reasonable and effective. Consistent breach of this
expectation is likely to institutionalize failure to the detriment of
the parties concerned. Undermined expectations and loss of trust and
respect, due to ineffective management, cannot easily be recovered. A
deterioration of trading and industrial relations will follow.
It should be recalled that Toyota took forty years to develop and
perfect the Toyota Production System (TPS) to the current level with
Japanese workers and suppliers. In contrast, NUMMI, a Toyota-GM joint
venture in California, was almost an instant success with allegedly the
most militant U.S. workers and many local suppliers. Over the last
forty years in Japan, Toyota's productivity and product quality
increased from a negligible level to the world's best. By the time the
NUMMI project was put into operation, the efficacy of TPS had been
tested out at least in Japan. Almost instantaneously, NUMMI proved
itself to be among the most efficient and highest-quality assembly
plants in North America (Krafcik, 1986). When a system can yield
I I
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results that are manifestly superior to those of a previous one, the
apparently least conducive or most adversarial conditions should not
constitute a barrier to obtaining support from those involved.
Despite the contentions of radical dualists who claim the
fracturing effects on the working class (e.g., Edwards, 1979), the
Japanese transplants, which brought in Japanese employment and supplier
management practices to the U.S. and the U.K., appear to be serving to
"unite" the "two nations", to bridge the division between middle-class
and working-class (White and Trevor, 1983) and to reconcile previously
antagonistic supplier relations (Dunning, 1986; Florida and Kenney,
1991). Furthermore, workers and suppliers, previously perceived as
problem generators, came to be increasingly treated as problem solvers -
- another departure from the traditional Western paradigm.
Problems of Western Learning
Early evidence of the author's research on automotive components
development in the U.S., Japan and Europe indicates that insofar as new
institutional arrangements are concerned Western, and in particular
U.S., producers are already fairly advanced (e.g., long-term contracts,
suppliers' early involvement, resident engineers). What is problematic,
as frequently voiced by managers of assemblers and suppliers alike, is
that there is a recognizable shortage of socio-human infrastructure for
the successful implementation of the new system. Distrust and timidity,
a result of long-standing adversarial relations, still linger. A
director of a U.S. independent brake manufacturer commented: "On
official occasions, our customers trumpet the benefits of concurrent
engineering and supplier involvement. But in reality harsh

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relationships still exist. For example, one of our customers did not
inform us of a design change in the suspension system of a car model. A
juddering problem occurred in steering. But the same brake unit is used
in another car model of this customer, and there's absolutely no
problem. You see, increased responsibility has often been used for
covering up inefficiencies in our customer's own organization." Also, a
manager of an independent car electronics components supplier in the
Midwest remarked: "Unlike the court system in this country, suppliers
are guilty until they are found to be innocent. Even the most
harmonious supplier relations in the U.S. are very-adversarial compared
to Japan." In a similar vein, a director in charge of quality at a
French assembler commented: "We have installed all the new programs,
from early involvement to supplier suggestions to profit sharing. But
our suppliers never respond. They are afraid they may be preyed upon in
a new way. More seriously, they don't know how to suggest a new idea,
not even how to create a new idea."
Evidence from the research suggests, furthermore, that there is
almost irreconcilable "social distance" between assemblers and suppliers
in the U.S. As part of the questionnaire survey (the more technical and
hard-evidence side of which will be reported on another occasion),
evaluation of trading partners is included. Figure 2 shows how
assemblers as customers are evaluated on a 1-5 scale by their automotive
components suppliers in the U.S. and Japan.
Figure 2 about here
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Between the two national groups, Japanese assemblers are perceived
by their suppliers as recognizably more problem-solving oriented, well
organized, dependable and technically oriented, whereas U.S. assemblers
are seen as more short-term business oriented and extremely adversarial.
The degree to which U.S. assemblers are reported as adversarial compared
to Japan is particularly worthy of note.
How, then, the suppliers are evaluated by the assemblers? Figure 3
below provides a clue.
Figure 3 about here
Forming a corresponding pair with what is demonstrated in Figure 2,
it is indicated that between the two national groups the U.S. suppliers
are perceived by their customers on a 1-5 scale as less problem-solving
oriented, well organized, dependable and far less compliant than the
Japanese suppliers.
While interpretations of these preliminary results could be
modified or influenced by further evidence that will be produced in the
course of the current research, one tendency seems to be clear. As it
stands, the social distance between assemblers and suppliers in the U.S.
appears to be prohibitively great. This means that there are
recognizable shortcomings of socio-human infrastructure in the U.S.
which is essential to the smooth implementation of the new paradigm.
Possibly, this could also apply to Western industrial societies at
large. Putting aside the debate about the necessity of direct Japanese
influence or Japanese culture for the successful transfer of management
"l~rm"~----"~~~""
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practice, it is inconceivable that the new model could work meaningfully
in such an antagonistic environment as indicated by the above two-way
evaluation data. This is because the new practice relies by design so
heavily on trusting interaction of trading partners.
Implications from Japan
The Japanese management paradigm is not in itself a panacea. As it
draws, too often excessively, on human commitment, the Japanese model is
exhausting and could be fragile (Nonaka, 1990: 243-4 & 265). Moreover,
if irreversible socioeconomic cracks occur in Japan either from within
(e.g., decay in work ethic, especially in management) or from without
(e.g., chronic labor shortage, unpredictable political and societal
crises), it could collapse.
Recent trends in Japan suggest, furthermore, that the traditional
paradigm of lean production may have reached a saturation point. In the
summer of 1990, for example, Mr. Tokumoto of JAW released an official
statement that JAW would not likely accept further pressure from
management to undertake more overtime work to meet the demand -- and in
particular to shorten already short enough product cycles. Parts of
Japanese management, led in part by Mr. Morita of Sony, have echoed this
in the general context of international pressure to reduce long working
hours in Japan. More recently, MITI has initiated an "administrative
guidance" to steer excessively competitive Japanese producers towards
lenqthening their current short product cycles especially in electronics
and automobiles (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, March 11, 1992). Finally, recent
recession has forced many Japanese manufacturers to cut down their
=4:=r= a
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impressive "full product line" inventories and discontinue many of the
existing models with no replacements.
All in all, these new trends in Japan suggest that the traditional
model of lean production itself is under revision. Western producers
need to re-examine what they perceive as lean production and be cautious
about uncritically pursuing what may well be becoming obsolete.
Conclusion
The question of transferability of the Japanese paradigm and whether or
not it could be a third form of organizing labor and production entails
complex issues and ramifications. While fairness, rationality and
integration are identified as important norms for the new model to work
meaningfully, a recognizable decay in management authority and
effectiveness in the Western business culture, as suggested by
significant social distance between assembler and supplier, is
problematic. Japan is also found to be re-examining its own paradigm in
adaptation to change. The dynamic and complex nature of the issues
concerned warrants further discussion and examination.
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